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"Nationalism, Secularism and Liberal Neutrality: The Danish Case of Judges and Religious
Symbols"NATIONALISM, SECULARISM AND LIBERAL NEUTRA 
LITY: THE DANISH CASE OF JUDGES AND RELIGIOUS
SYMBOLS
NILS HOLTUG
UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN
ABSTRACT
In 2009, a law was passed in the Danish parliament, according to which judges cannot
wear religious symbols in courts of law. First, I trace the development of this legislation
from resistance to Muslim religious practices on the nationalist right to ideas in main-
stream Danish politics about secularism and state neutrality – a process I refer to as‘lib-
eralization’.Second,Iconsider theplausibilityofsuchliberaljustificationsforrestrictions
onreligioussymbolsin thepublicsphereand,inparticular,for thebanon thewearingof
religious symbols by judges. I argue that such justifications are flawed and so are not
plausible corollaries of anti-Islamic justifications originating on the nationalist right.
RÉSUMÉ
En 2009,le Parlement danois a voté une loi qui stipule que l’interdiction pour les de por-
terdessignesreligieuxdansles tribunaux.Dansce texte,jeretraceenpremierlieuledé-
veloppement de cette législation, depuis la résistance aux pratiques musulmanes de la
droite nationaliste jusqu’aux idées répandues dans la politique danoise à propos du sé-
cularismeet delaneutralitéd’État –unprocessusquejequalifiede« libéralisation ».En
secondlieu,jeconsidèrelaplausibilitéde tellesjustificationslibéralesencequiconcerne
les restrictions sur la présence de symboles religieux dans la sphère publique et,en par-
ticulier, l’interdiction faite aux juges de porter des signes religieux.Je défends l’idée que
detellesjustificationssont déficienteset neconstituentpasdescorolairesplausiblesdes
justifications antimusulmanes en provenance de la droite nationaliste.
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11.INTRODUCTION
With increasing levels of diversity in liberal European states, religion is in-
creasingly becoming politicized. In particular, the influx of Muslims has been a
cause of controversy and heated debates over Muslim practices and Muslim sym-
bols in the public sphere, and even over the compatibility of Islam and liberal val-
ues.1 Not least in Denmark, where unusually restrictive policies have furthermore
been implemented, by European standards, in terms of for example immigra-
tion, naturalization, permanent residence and possibilities for work for asylum
seekers.2 In part, this can be seen as an expression of the real political influence
of the nationalist, right-wing Danish People’s Party.
In this article, I focus on political controversies regarding religious symbols in
the public sphere in Denmark, and the ways in which ideas originating on the na-
tionalist right are becoming part of mainstream politics and legislation by means
of a transformation of justifications. Thus, ideas about inherent problems in
Islam are transformed into ideas about the requirements of secularism and the
ideal of state neutrality.
To illustrate this process, I focus on a new law that renders it impermissible for
Danish judges to wear religious symbols in courts of law.While the ideas behind
this legislation were originally put forward by the Danish People’s Party in terms
of a general resistance to Muslim headscarves in the public sphere, motivated by
thoughts about the oppression of women and even about the (alleged) totalitar-
ian connotations of Muslim headscarves, the new law is explicitly motivated by
a concern for state neutrality and the impartiality of courts.
First, then, I trace the development of this legislation from resistance to Muslim
religious practices on the nationalist right to ideas in mainstream Danish politics
about secularism and state neutrality. I shall refer to this transformation of jus-
tifications as a process of ‘liberalization’. Second, I consider the plausibility of
such liberal justifications for restrictions on religious symbols in the public
sphere and, in particular, for the ban on the wearing of religious symbols by
judges in courts of law. I argue that such justifications are flawed and so are not
plausible corollaries of anti-Islamic justifications originating on the nationalist
right. In other words, while liberalization may sweeten the pill, it does not add
plausibility to opposition to judges’wearing Muslim symbols.
The case of religious symbols in courts of law is particularly interesting, com-
pared to other cases regarding religious symbols in the public sphere, for two rea-
sons. First, what originally sparked the resistance to judges’ wearing religious
symbols was a concern about a specific such symbol, namely the Muslim head-
scarf. However, there are in fact no female Muslim judges in Denmark wearing
headscarves, and nor is there any indication that this would occur in the near fu-
ture. In that respect, the law may be said to have more symbolic value than to ad-
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1dress an imminent problem (insofar as we consider judges wearing headscarves
a problem). Second, the case of judges wearing religious symbols is interesting
because at least some liberals, who are otherwise rather sceptical about restric-
tions on religious freedom in the public sphere may feel that this is a special
case. After all, courts are particularly endowed with notions of neutrality and
impartiality, as symbolized by goddess Justitia,b l i n d f o l d e da n dc a r r y i n gt h e
weights of justice.
2.THE DANISH POLITICAL DEBATE ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS
In Denmark, a liberal-conservative coalition, consisting of the liberal party Ven-
stre3 and the Conservative People’s Party,c a m ei n t op o w e ri n2 0 0 1a n dt h e y
have won two consecutive elections since then.They have in various ways tight-
ened immigration policies, reduced social benefits for immigrants, and intro-
duced more restrictive rules for citizenship and permanent residence (including
more difficult language tests and knowledge tests of Danish politics, history and
culture). It is generally acknowledged that such policies, as well as a “tougher”
terminology when addressing the crime, educational underachievement, unem-
ployment, and (allegedly) illiberal practices of (some) immigrants and their de-
scendents have played a significant role with respect to winning three
consecutive elections.
However, the liberal-conservative coalition does not have a majority in the Dan-
ish parliament and they have relied systematically for parliamentary support on
the Danish People’s Party.I nt h i sr e s p e c t ,t h eDanish People’s Party has had
more real and sustained influence on state policy-making than most other right-
wing nationalist parties in Western Europe. And they have consistently pushed
for more restrictive immigration policies and for policies of assimilation as a
condition for providing the parliamentary support needed by the government.
In particular, Muslims in Denmark have been targeted by the Danish People’s
Party. Recurrent themes are that Islam and liberal values are incompatible and
that Islam is an aggressive, expansionist ideology. For example, Mogens Camre,
former member of the European Parliament has stated: “Islam cannot be inte-
grated,” “Islam wants to dominate Europe,” “they [the Muslims] are here be-
cause expansion into, and domination of, theWest is on the agenda of Islam,” and
“Muslims belong in Muslim-land, and that ain’t here.”4 Likewise, KristianThule-
sen Dahl and Søren Espersen, prominent MPs, have said, respectively: “In many
ways we are anti-Muslims”, and “I think Islam is the largest problem in the
world.” Louise Frevert, former MP, has compared Islam to a “cancer”, and Pia
Kjærsgaard, MP and chairman of the party, has suggested that “Islam is, in
essence …. a religion that cherishes violence.”
While these are some of the more extreme statements made by representatives
of the Danish People’s Party,t h e ya r ea l s os u g g e s t i v ew i t hr e s p e c tt oc o n c e p t i o n s
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1of Islam on the nationalist right.Thus, ideas of Islam as a totalitarian, oppressive,
sexist, violent ideology are recurrent themes. Also, as we have seen, the sug-
gestion that Muslims are scheming to conquer the West and that Muslim immi-
grants constitute a vanguard is a common figure of thought.
Indeed, some of these ideas about Islam and Muslims are also to be found as
motivations for resistance to Muslim religious institutions and symbols, includ-
ing opposition to mosques, minarets, burial grounds, and headwear and clothing
in the form of hijabs, niqabs and burqas. The Danish People’s Party has pro-
posed that headscarves should be removed from the public sphere, and should
thus not be worn by MPs, teachers, students, doctors, nurses, policemen, social
workers, soldiers and judges. Indeed, Pia Kjærsgaard has stated that: “Islamic
headscarves, and all that they represent, do not belong in Denmark.”5This is be-
cause they are distinctly “un-Danish.”6 In fact, the idea that practices or policies
are unfitting (in Denmark) because they are ‘un-Danish’has spread from the na-
tionalist right to mainstream and (even) leftist politics, and is now a term com-
monly used to discredit ideas and policies with which one disagrees.
The particular ways in which headscarves are considered un-Danish pertain to
ideas about them being oppressive towards women, expressions of a totalitarian
ideology and signs of lack of will to integrate. In fact, Søren Krarup, MP, de-
clared in 2007 that: “Islam is not a religion, but a totalitarian system, and so of
the same kind as the totalitarian systems of the 20th Century – Communism and
Nazism”, and so “insofar as one says that the swastika is a symbol of Nazism, it
is of the same kind as the headscarf of Islam.”7 Pia Kjærsgaard, who herself con-
siders the headscarf a symbol of political Islam,8 later confirmed this interpre-
tation: “I completely agree with Søren Krarup that it is the exact same symbol
– a headscarf and a swastika.”9
The Danish People’s Party has succeeded in bringing Muslim religious symbols
on the political agenda, such that worries about Muslim symbols are increas-
ingly also being raised by individual members of the liberal-conservative coali-
tion and individual Social Democrats. However, the new law, from June 2009,
prohibiting judges from wearing religious (as well as political) symbols in courts
of law,10 indicates a novel strand, in that a parliamentary majority has passed a
law to prevent religious symbols in (a particular part of) the public sphere.
The debate, leading up to the proposal of the law, was triggered by a statement
by the Courts of Denmark implying that judges should be allowed to wear Mus-
lim headscarves. The Danish People’s Party opposed this decision and accused
the government of being indecisive on the issue, and after some hesitation a law
proposal was drafted by the government and eventually passed with the votes of
the liberal-conservative coalition, the Danish People’s Party and the Social De-
mocrats.
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1However, the ideas that have been used to motivate the law have undergone a
transformation in the process. More precisely, there are two sets of justifications
at work at the same time. One pertains to the headscarf as an Islamic symbol –
ac o n c e rnt h a th a sr e p e a t e d l yb e e nr a i s e dt h eDanish People’s Party.Anditisin-
teresting that the public political debate leading up to the drafting of the law fo-
cused almost exclusively on Muslim headscarves rather than on religious
symbols more generally. Notably, this was the case not just for Danish People
Party MPs, but also for MPs from the liberal-conservative coalition. Indeed, re-
ligious symbols in courts of law simply had not been on the agenda until the
question of Muslim headscarves surfaced in the debate.
However, even though the debate focused on headscarves, it also increasingly
began to address issues of impartiality and neutrality. For example, Lene Es-
persen, who was Minister of Justice at the time when the debate took off, stated
that she feared headscarves would threaten the neutrality of the courts.11And in
the law proposal that followed, the focus was on religious symbols quite gener-
ally. It was pointed out that it is essential that judges are independent and im-
partial, and it was explicitly stated that the purpose of the law is that judges shall
appear religiously and politically neutral in courts of law.12
Indeed, focus on secularism and state neutrality illustrates another strategy in
contemporary Danish politics for tackling issues of religious and cultural diver-
sity. It has been voiced by, among others, former Prime Minister and leader of
the liberal-conservative coalition, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who publicly sug-
gested that there should be less religion in the public sphere.This was a call for
a further secularization of society. However, while it may seem reminiscent of
French conceptions of laïcité,13 it is also in important ways different. Thus,
among Danish politicians it has in general not been accompanied by a desire to
abandon the Danish established church, and in this respect, Rasmussen is no ex-
ception. In fact, he explicitly supports the existence of an established church in
Denmark. Furthermore, he specifically justifies his call for less religion in the
public sphere in terms of a Lutheran conception of the separation of religious and
worldly affairs,14 which, again, constitutes a departure from French laïcité.
Now, the move from the initial debate about Muslim headscarves, and the legit-
imacy of judges wearing them, can be described as a process of liberalization,
where concerns about state neutrality end up motivating the law proposal. Not
in the sense that the initial scepticism towards specifically Muslim symbols no
longer plays a role, but in the sense that a second, more liberal justification is
complementing it, and indeed constitutes the official motivation for the law.That
Muslim symbols are nevertheless still considered special – and especially prob-
lematic – is suggested by the following considerations: 1) the political debate fo-
cused almost exclusively on headscarves; 2) it was only when the Courts of
Denmark stated that headscarves would be permitted that religious symbols in
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1courts even became an issue; and 3) while the official motivation for the law
was to ensure that courts appear religiously neutral to citizens, no efforts have
been made to get rid of a logo, used by the Danish courts, that includes a Chris-
tian cross.
It is also worth stressing that the drafting of the proposal in terms of a general
ban on religious symbols may serve a strategic purpose, namely to rule out con-
flicts with anti-discrimination legislation.This strategic advantage may also have
been the Danish People’s Party’s reason for adopting the neutralist justification
for the law proposal,15 while also pushing the agenda of discrediting Muslim
symbols.As an example of the latter, in response to the Courts of Denmark de-
cision, they launched a campaign with posters portraying a niqab-wearing judge,
with the word ‘submission’ written underneath (although niqabs had not been
part of the debate and were not what the Courts of Denmark had opened up for).
A more recent development, which illustrates resistance in parts of the liberal-
conservative coalition to at least some Muslim symbols, is a proposal from the
Conservative People’s Party, according to which burqas and niqabs should be
banned in the public sphere (literally, from the moment one steps out on the side-
walk).16This proposal, which mirrors proposals in Belgium and France, was mo-
tivated by a concern for Muslim women, who were claimed to be forced to wear
them, and the idea that such clothing is oppressive. On this basis, the government
commissioned a report on the use of burqas and niqabs in Denmark.The report
concluded that between 100 and 200 hundred women wear burqas or niqabs (the
report did not distinguish, because the number of women wearing burqas is es-
timated to be very low; the authors of the report afterwards suggested two or
three).About half of these 100-200 women are ethnic Danes who have converted
to Islam.17
The authors of the report did not find a case for claiming that women are forced
to wear burqas or niqabs.A n dw h i l et h ec o n s e r v a t i v ep r o p o s a ld i do r i g i n a l l y
gain support from the Social Democrats (besides the Danish People’s Party),
Venstre, the other party in the liberal-conservative coalition, ended up not sup-
porting it and it was eventually dropped.
In this section I have argued that ideas about Muslim symbols in the public
sphere, originating on the nationalist right, have made it into mainstream poli-
tics, but have also undergone a transformation in the form of liberalization. More
specifically, two kinds of justifications are at work at the same time, namely
both the initial scepticism with respect to Muslim symbols, but also a secular
one, urging state neutrality. In particular, I have suggested that the emergence of
the ban on religious symbols, worn by judges in courts of law can be understood
in this way, but I believe that this case is an instance of a more general pattern.
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1Since secularism and state neutrality thus become official justifications, for ex-
ample for the new Danish law, it is of course worth asking whether they are plau-
sible justifications. In the rest of the paper, I consider this question in relation to
the Danish law.Another way of putting this is whether resistance to Muslim sym-
bols in courts of law can be justified by transforming such resistance into an
issue of state neutrality and general opposition to religious symbols in this set-
ting.
3.STATE NEUTRALITY
While the new Danish law was officially motivated by the idea that courts should
appear neutral to citizens, it is not entirely clear how this is to be understood and
inthefollowing,Ishallconsiderandassessvariousinterpretations.Accordingtothe
traditional liberal ideal of state neutrality, the state should not favour any particular
conception of the good at the expense of other such conceptions.There are various
ways of understanding this but usually, contemporary political theorists have in
mind the ideal of neutrality of justification,t h a ti s ,t h ei d e at h a tt h es t a t es h o u l dn o t
justify its policies on the basis of a specific conception of the good.18
State neutrality thus relies on a distinction between political conceptions and
conceptions of the good.19 While both include value judgements, the former in-
cludes only ‘thin’ claims about liberal justice, whereas the latter may include
‘thick’judgements about virtually any aspect of how we should go about living
our lives.Thus, religious claims constitute a conception of the good and so can-
not legitimately be invoked to justify state policies.
Whatever plausibility this ideal of state neutrality has, it is clear that it does not
in itself rule out much religion in the public sphere.20 Thus, it is quite compati-
ble with a policy that allows employees in public institutions to express their re-
ligion in the form of religious symbols, as long as this policy does not appeal to
a conception of the good. So if a state policy permits judges to wear religious
symbols on the basis that it should respect their freedom of religion, this is quite
compatible with state neutrality, because freedom of religion is a political doc-
trine. In fact, neutrality of justification is even compatible with the existence of
an established church, as long as it is justified politically, say, as a way of pro-
moting social cohesion in society.21
There are of course other ways of understanding state neutrality, including the
idea of neutrality of consequences.Accordingtothisdoctrine,allconceptionsof
the good should fare equally well in society – no matter how expensive or unat-
tractive they are.Will Kymlicka remarks that this doctrine in fact seems quite il-
liberal, as it does not respect freedom of choice and does not hold people
responsible for the costs of their choices.22 However this may be, it is difficult to
see how it could be used to justify the prohibition on judges wearing religious
symbols in courts. In fact, it seems to be a doctrine better equipped to argue the
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1opposite, since religious judges may point out that, unlike other conceptions of
the good, their conceptions are being restricted by the Danish law.
It may be suggested that we need to distinguish between ‘civilians’ and repre-
sentatives of the state when considering religious symbols in the public sphere.
Thus, it could be argued that unlike for example children in schools, civil ser-
vants and other state employees – especially those with whom citizens are con-
fronted – represent the state and therefore particularly stringent rules apply to
them with respect to what symbols they employ. Insofar as they wear a religious
symbol, they will be signalling state affiliation with this religion. However, note
first that neither of the two conceptions of state neutrality considered so far im-
plies that policies should be more restrictive for state employees.With respect to
neutrality of justification, permissive policies for state employees may still be
justified in terms of freedom of religion, and with respect to neutrality of con-
sequences, a policy that hinders the expression of religion through symbols will
still be easier to comply with under some conceptions of the good than under oth-
ers, even if it applies only to state employees.
Second, it is not clear that for example judges wearing religious symbols can be
said to be expressing anything about state affiliations to religions. After all, no
one is suggesting that female judges wearing make-up are expressing anything
about state attitudes to gender roles, or that male judges with long hair are ex-
pressing a state commitment to hippie culture.A different question, however, is
whether people are likely to perceive judges wearing religious symbols as bi-
ased rather than impartial, and I return to this issue in Section 5.
4.EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
State neutrality can be said to express an ideal of equality in the sense that state
policies should not favour some individuals over others by promoting their par-
ticular conception of the good.Thus, one way of understanding the concern for
state neutrality is as a concern that state policies should imply equal opportuni-
ties for individuals to live according to their particular such conception. In fact,
when the new Danish law was proposed to the parliament by Brian Mikkelsen,
who had by then replaced Lene Espersen as Minister of Justice, he emphasized
that the law is compatible with a principle of equal treatment of persons, irre-
spective of their gender, race, language, religion, political views, national or so-
cial affiliation etc., although this was not explicitly used to motivate the law, but
rather to emphasize that it does not conflict with the European Convention on
Human Rights.23 The reason given was that the law applies to all religions (and
political views).
Political theorists have likewise stressed the relation between state neutrality and
some form of equality of opportunity. For example, one of Robert Audi’s prin-
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1ciples for the separation of state and church – what he calls the ‘equalitarian prin-
ciple’ – is concerned with discrimination that limits the opportunities of people
withspecificreligions,24andVeitBader’sprincipleof‘relationalneutrality’requires
as t a t e“ e q u i d i s t a n tt ob o t hr e l i g i o u sa n ds e c u l a rw o r l d v i e w sa n dp r a c t i c e s ” . 25
Interestingly, there are also interpretations of French laïcité that stress the rela-
tion between neutrality and equality of opportunity, and are furthermore taken
to imply that state employees must not wear religious symbols.26 Thus, Cécile
Laborde writes:
More attention has been paid to the question of the legitimacy
of the expression of religious faith by state agents. We have
seen that laïcité postulates that only if the public sphere is kept
free of all religious symbols can it treat citizens equally. This
puts stringent limits on the expression of religious beliefs by
public functionaries. Official republicans insist that a line be
drawn between ‘freedom of conscience’ and the ‘expression
of faith in the public sphere’. It is not always legitimate for cit-
izens to ‘make use of a private right in public’: in the public
sphere, the value of religious freedom must be balanced
against other values derived from the principle of laïcité as
neutrality.27
The egalitarian principle to which Laborde alludes “requires that the state does
not give preference to one religion over another: the equality referred to here is
equality between believers of all faiths”.28 She furthermore stresses the similar-
ities between this conception and Brian Barry’s liberal egalitarianism in Culture
and Equality, and indeed, Barry here characterizes neutrality as “a coherent no-
tion that defines the terms of equal treatment for different religions”.29
However, it is difficult to see how a ban on the wearing of religious symbols by
‘state agents’can flow from an ideal of equal treatment, or for that matter from
other ideals of equality of opportunity. Consider again the new Danish law. It is
of course true that since all religious symbols are banned, there is a sense in
which the law treats different religions, and the people affiliated with them,
equally. However, it is by no means clear that it is the only way of doing so. Sup-
pose, for example, that everyone was allowed to wear the religious symbols he
or she happened to prefer.There is also a sense in which this rule would treat in-
dividuals equally. So even if we were to acknowledge that the ban on religious
symbols is a way of treating people equally, it is not clear how the principle of
equal treatment is supposed to imply such a ban.
This is important because, as Laborde concedes in the passage quoted above,
there seem to be other important liberal principles that speak against a ban.
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1Laborde mentions freedom of conscience, but we might equally invoke freedom
of expression. If both a ban on all religious symbols and a policy that allows
people to wear the religious symbols of their choice are compatible with equal
treatment, the basic liberties mentioned seem to tilt the balance in favour of the
latter policy.
Furthermore, the claim that a ban on wearing religious symbols constitutes equal
treatment may be challenged.This is particularly clear when we consider the in-
terests not just of people with different religions, but also of atheists. For athe-
ists, the ban on religious symbols is costless, which, obviously, it is not for people
for whom wearing religious symbols to work is important. Equally, the law is
costless for people who are religious but have no desire to wear religious sym-
bols or are able to hide them under their clothing (and have no desire to wear
them ‘openly’).Therefore, arguably, the ban on religious symbols does not treat
people equally. In fact, this very complaint was raised by the largest organiza-
tion for Muslims in Denmark (Muslimernes Fællesråd), who argued that while
the ban on religious symbols is formally equal, it is only Muslim women who are
prevented from wearing their religious symbols (because other symbols can be
hidden under clothes or wigs).30
To consider this argument in greater detail, we need to distinguish between dif-
ferent conceptions of equality of opportunity.After all, it may be suggested that
while the law impacts differently on different individuals depending on their re-
ligious commitments, this is quite compatible with equality of opportunity. In
fact, this is a point Barry stresses repeatedly in Culture and Equality. Thus, he
argues that “if uniform rules create identical choice sets, then opportunities are
equal”,31 and in particular this can be so even if some people derive more satis-
faction from the rules than others.To illustrate: even if a law that prohibits drugs
impacts differently on different people (depending on whether they would be in-
clined to take drugs or not), this does not imply that the law violates equality of
opportunity. Likewise, even if a law that prevents judges from wearing religious
symbols impacts differently on people, this does not challenge the claim that it
creates equal opportunities.32
Now, I have criticized this account of Barry’s in detail elsewhere,33 but here I
merely want to suggest that it cannot be used to discredit the claim that the new
Danish law violates equal opportunities. It is true that there is a sense in which
the law generates identical choice sets for everyone, because it gives everyone
the same option: if one wants to be a judge, one must avoid wearing religious
symbols in court. But even if the law gives rise to identical choice sets in this
sense, this is not sufficient to guarantee equal opportunities.After all, a law that
requires judges to wear Muslim headscarves would give people identical choice
sets in the same sense. It gives everyone the same option: if one wants to be a
judge, one must wear a Muslim headscarf in court. But clearly this latter law
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1would not give people equal opportunities. So the fact that a law gives everyone
the same option does not guarantee equality of opportunity. In fact, it is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for such equality.34
The reason a law requiring judges to wear Muslim headscarves does not give
people equal opportunities, I suggest, is that it gives rise to different levels of ad-
vantages, depending on people’s religious commitments.35And this, of course, is
precisely the point of the claim that the new Danish law violates equality of op-
portunity. It gives rise to different levels of advantages for different individuals
depending on their religious affiliation.
Of course, in order to assess levels of advantages, we need an account of
the currency of egalitarian justice. Consider, first, equality of resources. Roughly,
this account implies that a distribution of resources is equal if it would result
from an auction in which individuals have equal purchasing power.36 Now, access
to wearing religious symbols need not directly affect people’s purchasing power.
Nevertheless, equality of resources implies that it would be wrong to gratuitously
limit people’s access to specific resources, and this would seem to include the re-
source of wearing a religious symbol.After all, Dworkin’s auction is incompat-
ible with arbitrary restrictions on the kinds of resources people can acquire. As
Dworkin himself points out, if the auctioneer were to transform all the available
resources into a large stock of plover’s eggs and pre-phylloxera claret for which
people could bid, then this would hardly result in a fair distribution of resources.37
Everything else being equal, we should assume maximal freedom both with re-
spect to the kind of resources people can acquire in the auction and the uses they
are entitled to make of them, because this will allow people to maximally express
their preferences in the auction.38 So limiting judges’ access to religious sym-
bols in courts would be illegitimate, according to equality of resources, unless
an appropriate independent reason could be given for doing so.And note that no
such reason has surfaced in my discussion so far.
If, instead, we focus on welfare, or opportunities for welfare, as the currency of
egalitarian justice, it seems clear that the Danish law will have different impact
on people depending on their religious commitments. For example, it will frus-
trate the (self-regarding) preferences of Muslim women aspiring to be headscarf-
wearing judges but not of, for example, atheists. So like equality of resources,
equality of (opportunity for) welfare would seem to provide a case against the
new Danish law, everything else being equal.
Of course, insofar as our focus is on opportunities for welfare, there is an issue
of whether people should be held responsible for their specific religious prefer-
ences in such a way that, for example, they have no legitimate complaint if a law
makes it more difficult for them to satisfy these preferences than it does for other
people to satisfy their religious (or other) preferences.39 I argue elsewhere that,
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1according to equality of opportunity for welfare, we should not in general hold
people responsible for their religious preferences in this way, in part because
such preferences are typically acquired as a part of childhood socialization and
are often costly to abandon.40 However, I shall not repeat this argument here.
Nevertheless, note that we would not in general want to hold people responsible
for their religious preferences in the way considered above. For example, with
respect to the imagined law that requires judges to wear Muslim headscarves, we
would not want to excuse the differential impact of this law on the basis that this
difference is due to differences in people’s religious preferences, for which they
should be held responsible.Therefore, like equality of resources, equality of op-
portunity for welfare would indeed seem to imply that the differential impact of
the new Danish law implies a violation of equality of opportunity, everything
else being equal.
Before I end this section, let me briefly point out that when considering equal-
ity of opportunity so far, I have been focusing on the extent to which specific
rules (such as the new Danish law) have differential impact. Thus, I have been
considering whether such rules produce inequality of opportunities. However, it
may be (plausibly) argued that what matters is rather whether such inequalities
will exist if the rules are implemented.To illustrate, a policy of giving to citizens
an equal sum of money does not in itself produce inequalities of opportunity,
but it may well maintain (or even increase) them, for example because some
people with disabilities need to spend a certain proportion of this sum on med-
icine. However, even if we shift the focus and consider which inequalities exist
once the law is implemented, this does not seem to alter the conclusion that the
law violates equality of opportunity.After all, the individuals primarily targeted
by the law are Muslim women, and since this is hardly a privileged group, it is
also not a group that is compensated for the comparative disadvantage to which
the law gives rise by other advantages to which they have access.
5.IMPARTIALITY
As pointed out above, it was stated in the proposal of the new Danish law that it
is essential that judges are independent and impartial. While this was not ex-
plicitly used in the proposal to motivate the law, some politicians from the Dan-
ish People’s Party have suggested that there is a real risk that judges wearing
headscarves will not be impartial.41 However, there are at least three reasons why
this concern seems misplaced. First, there is no empirical evidence to suggest
that judges wearing headscarves or other religious symbols would be more prone
to partial judgements than would other judges. Second, the real worry expressed
here does not concern religious symbols as such, but rather the religious com-
mitments that cause people to wear them. Removing the symbols therefore does
not remove the real cause of concern, namely the underlying religious commit-
ment.42And third, there are already independence requirements for judges to se-
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1cure that a judge does not rule in a case where his or her independence may be
questioned.43
Nevertheless, as also pointed out above, there is another concern pertaining to
impartiality – and one that was officially used to motivate the law – namely that
judges should appear religiously neutral in courts of law. This concern is not
with whether judges are impartial, but whether they are perceived to be impar-
tial by the general public. The fear is that if people do not consider judges im-
partial, their trust in the judicial system will be undermined.44
Here, however, we need to be careful.The issues raised by this argument for the
law are in fact much more general than is conceded in the law proposal.After all,
there can be all sorts of reasons why people do not have faith in judges. Men who
are accused of rape may doubt they will be given a fair treatment by a female
judge. Squatters may doubt they will receive a fair trial if the judge is a suit-
wearing, conservative-looking ‘stiff’. Equally, it seems likely that when female
judges first appeared, some people (and, presumably, mostly men) were con-
cerned about their capacities for rational, impartial judgement.
This suggests that the mere fact that some people do not trust judges with spe-
cific characteristics can hardly constitute a sufficient reason not to allow judges
to have these characteristics. For example, distrust in the rational capacities of
women has of course never been a good reason to ban female judges. Rather
than give in to discriminatory gender stereotypes, such stereotypes should be
fought by allowing women to become judges and thus to show that they are
equally capable of performing the job.And the overwhelming acceptance of fe-
male judges today indicates that this has indeed been a successful strategy.
Why should we then think differently of judges who wear religious symbols?
Even if some people are inclined not to trust judges who wear such symbols (or,
more specifically, Muslim headscarves, which was after all the particular sym-
bol that raised the debate and paved the way for the law in the first place), why
would we want to accommodate that concern by banning religious symbols? Un-
less, at least, there is reason to suppose that judges wearing religious symbols in
courts will lead to a massive break down in trust in the judicial system, and there
is no evidence to suggest that this would be the case.
In fact, the DanishAssociation of Judges expressed that it does not condone the
new law, and argued that people already respect and trust the Danish courts,
where the law will not contribute to such trust.45And another Danish judicial or-
ganisation even suggested that the new law is likely to diminish trust in courts,
because apart from the ban on religious symbols it also includes a requirement
that some judges should wear capes, which creates an impression of elitist
judges, who do not reflect the society that surrounds them.46 However this may
1
1
9
V
O
L
U
M
E
6
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
A
U
T
O
M
N
E
/
F
A
L
L
2
0
1
1be, it seems that Danish judges have in general not shared the worries moti-
vating the law, concerning a loss of trust in courts due to the presence of re-
ligious symbols.
Letmeverybrieflyalsomentionanother,lessprincipledconceptionof‘neutrality’,
which also concerns the way in which judges appear to people. According to this
conception, a person is neutrally dressed in so far as her clothes do not ‘stand out’
or ‘arouse attention’. However, what counts as neutral in this sense will of course
vary across different cultural and religious groups in society.And to legally fix dress
codes for judges simply on the basis of majority conceptions of what it is normal
andappropriatetowearseemsbothmoralisticandtoplungeintothewatersofwhat
JohnStuartMillreferredtoasthe‘tyrannyofthemajority’.47Thisishardlytheway
forward insofar as our concern is with liberal justifications.
This is not to suggest that ‘anything goes’for judges in courts of law and indeed,
the question of exactly where to draw the line is a difficult one. I have already
pointedoutthatthereareindependencerequirementsforjudgesandthisis,itseems
tome,asitshouldbe.So,forexample,wearingat-shirtforacompanythatisunder
trial would indicate that a judge should not be considered independent in the rele-
vant case. For the same sort of reason, there may be cases in which judges wearing
religious symbols should not be used, where these symbols may in one way or an-
other suggest that a judge cannot be considered independent in a particular case.
Andpresumablytherearecertainothersymbols,forexample,swastikas,thatshould
notbe admitted, atleastin partbecause by wearing it, a judge would indicate a lack
ofcommitmenttothedemocraticbasisforthestate(includingthejudicialsystem),
which may raise the suspicion that he or she would not feel committed to its laws.48
Nevertheless, as suggested above, the issue of where to draw the line is a difficult
one, and I do not pretend to have exhaustively dealt with it here.
6.CONCLUSION
Ih a v ea r g u e dt h a tt h ev a l u e su n d e r p i n n i n gt h en e wD a n i s hl a wh a v eg o n e
through a transformation, originating in anti-Islamic concerns on the nation-
alist right and then gradually moving towards secular concerns with liberal
neutrality. Not in the sense that the former values were replaced, but in the
sense that the latter kind increasingly supplemented them and indeed formed
the official justification for the law.
Furthermore, I have argued that the law cannot be justified in terms of liberal
neutrality. This is so whether we conceive of such neutrality as neutrality of
justification, neutrality of consequences, equality of opportunity, or real or
perceived impartiality. In fact, several of these interpretations imply that the
law is unjust. This is a worrying result, especially since there are also other
liberal values that seem to imply that the law is dubious, including freedom of
religion and freedom of expression.
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While I have been specifically concerned with the ban on judges’wearing reli-
gious symbols in courts, I believe that this case illustrates a more general ten-
dency of trying to liberalize anti-Islamic concerns that are, in fact, quite illiberal.
Furthermore, the arguments I have employed have implications for a wider range
of issues concerning religious symbols in the public sphere, both in Denmark and
elsewhere. For example, many of them are equally relevant when assessing re-
strictions on religious symbols, including headscarves, in schools.49RÉFÉRENCES
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see e.g. Joppke, 2009, and Laborde, 2005.
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Dagblad, 30.6.2006.
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23 Dommeres fremtræden i retsmøder, lovforslag nr. L98, folketingsåret 2008/2009, under “Be-
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25 Bader, 2007, p. 101.
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27 Laborde, 2005, p. 322.
28 Laborde, 2005, p. 309.
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under retsmøder”,http://www.mfr.nu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
51:horingssvar-ifm-lovforslag-om-kvindelige-dommeres-fremtraeden-under-
retsmoder&catid=1:seneste-nyheder&Itemid=29.
31 Barry, 2001, p. 32.
1
2
3
V
O
L
U
M
E
6
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
A
U
T
O
M
N
E
/
F
A
L
L
2
0
1
132 Note, incidentally, that while Barry in his discussion focuses on the case for difference-blind
rights and against group-differentiated rights, this is not what is at issue here.After all, the new
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want to wear a headscarf. 3) In any case, equality of opportunity cannot simply be a matter
of the range of valuable options. A law that requires judges not to be fans of Manchester
United leaves the bulk of valuable options intact, including the option for judges of being
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42 Of course, the ban on religious symbols may prevent some Muslims from becoming judges,
and preventing this may have been part of the motivation for the Danish People’s Party, but
presumably this justification would conflict with existing anti-discrimination legislation, and
is in any case incompatible with the kind of liberal justification for the law I am presently con-
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43 Dommerfuldmægtigforeningen, ”Letter to the Ministry of Justice”, 8.12.2008.
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47 Mill, 1962, p. 129.
48 Of course, as we have seen, some members of the Danish People’s Party consider headscarves
morally on a par with a swastika. Less dramatically, headscarves are sometimes characterized
as patriarchal, connoting female inferiority and expressing a desire to control women’s sexu-
ality. However, headscarves seem far more open to different interpretations than e.g. swastikas,
where some interpretations of the former imply they are oppressive and others that they are
liberating, including that of the ‘autonomous veil’worn by young second-generation Muslims
in France, signifying a protest against racism, and “the desire to be French and Muslim, mod-
ern and veiled, autonomous and dressed in the Islamic way” (Joppke, 2009, p. 13; Joppke at-
tributes the quote to Gaspard and Khosrokhavar, 1995. For a similar variety of interpretations
in a Danish context, based on interviews with Muslim women, seeTina Magaard’s report, At
være muslimsk kvinde i Danmark, 2009, Ch. 4). Given the variety of reasons Muslim women
may thus have for wearing a headscarf, it would be problematic to uniquely privilege a par-
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1ticular interpretation and, in any case, a liberal state should be wary of ruling out headwear
that may be considered sexist, whether it be headscarves or make-up. (However, for an argu-
ment to the effect that (one form of) liberalism may be compatible a ban on religious sym-
bols in the public sphere, see Joppke, 2009.)
49 For comments on an earlier version of this article, I would like to thank participants at the
workshop on Religious Diversity in the Liberal State at Centre for the Study of Equality and
Multiculturalism, University of Copenhagen, 2010, and especially Søren Flinch Midtgaard,
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